Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 19 27

[SFCharlie]

A continuation of our discussion of this failure. Best to read the other threads first to avoid rehashing things already discussed.
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 02
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 03
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 04
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 05
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 06
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 07
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 08
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 09
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 10
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 11
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 12
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 13
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 14
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 15
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 16
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 17
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 18

 

[Dave.Smith.NYC]

Lexpatrie -
I'm happy to see you have come a long way from telling me I was inaccurate and errantly claiming I didn't understand the Morabito repair drawings. Though, I see you still are a bit confused and have some more questions, no worries I got you.

I've not seen anybody post an opinion on punching shear along with their own calculations on it

You then literally post a photo of WJE's calculation summary. If you want the math spelled out, I worked up a quick Excel file for you to see below.

The punching shear calculations presented by WJE are along column line T. This area does not appear to have failed during the collapse, at any point...
Unless I understand WJE wrong...

You must understand WJE wrong, their entire presentation focuses in on K13.1. it's even on the screenshot you have. Their calculations are not for column line T?
Based on the label on their table and their discussion, the "as design" column calc is back in 1980 utilizing calculations from ACI 318-77. For their "at collapse" calculation, their dead load includes the weight from the 96 renovations.

"current research" indicates factor of 4 may be unconservative for lighter reinforcement ratios. That's not something you can put onto Morabito, the original design engineer, or the 1996 guy. Too bad they don't cite a reference...

There are actually number of publications about reductions in punching shear under high sustained loads, especially in columns with low fluctual reinforcement (since punching shear is actually flexural behavior). One of the main researchers on the topic was published in 1960 by Rüsch. I included that reference in my calc for you.
The reduction in the constant for Vc (4 to 3) has nothing to do with the work the engineer should have done. That is a failure predictive capacity calculation by WJE to explain the trigger of the punching shear under essentially a non-live load condition.
However, keep in mind Morabito, the 96 engineer, and the original engineer would have been required to utilize the design equations. Had they done that, they would have seen that it was 72% above what the Code would have allowed (using a factor of 4 and no construction errors). Further, it would be worse than 72% if you included the weight from 96. So if Morabito had checked this, or had recognized that the photos they took of the planter were evidence of a fairly far progressed punching sheer failure (WJE says in the presentation that Morabito was the firm that took the pictures of that plantar distress), they would have figured out there was a major problem around k13.1.

I recognize that Morabito wasn't required to verify the original design during the first pass of an assessment. As I mentioned, I don't think they did a particularly poor job, and it's much easier in hindsight to recognize the punching shear problem wasn't just a planter problem. However, had they said, "Hey it looks like the deck is deflecting and is resulting in distress to the planter above" they probably then would have checked to see the demanded capacity of the column, which even if they ran it under design loads (which would have been the most likely thing to do) and they used a factor of 4 for their punching sheer calcs (something very reasonable for them to do); they still would have seen that they had a major design problem. I've mentioned several times in this thread that over the majority of the life of the structure evidence of the punching shoe problem would not have been visibly evident. However, Morabito happened to take pictures of the planner before and after the deck deflection started, again which is a very late mechanism (close to collapse) in the progression of a punching shear failure.

What I'm saying is, mistakes by engineers are the primary sources of the collapse; not failures by contractors; not failures by the association; not failures by inspectors. The original engineer designed it with 72% less capacity than it was minimally required to have by code; the 96 engineer, did not check the capacity of the deck to column connections, even though they were adding substantial weight.; and the recertification engineer, failed to identify evidence of a problem.

The first two engineers are primarily culpable, but any of those three engineers could have prevented the failure.


(A quick aside, that language from Miami-Dade regarding "time tested" is simply not true, its absolute nonsense, but that's a topic for another day.)

 

[zebraso]

that language from Miami-Dade regarding "time tested" is simply not true, its absolute nonsense, but that's a topic for another day.

It may just be as relevant as anything that has been discussed. The thing that seems ambiguous, is regarding the qualification that the loading conditions and patterns have not changed and that such can be determined without verifying the original design. It sounds like white wash to me. In and of itself the policy might be cited as a contributing factor.

 

[lexpatrie]

Dave, read what I'm writing versus skimming, deciding what I'm writing and then "refuting" it and saying I'm "confused." You can stop that now. Thanks.

So we're clear, I still think you're inaccurate, you've just glossed past it and declared mission accomplished. Maybe you have documentation I don't know about.

You have an opinion, it's on you to present evidence for it. You are expected to lay the foundation for your opinion. You have the burden of proof here, it isn't my job to disprove whatever you write, it's on you to prove it, it's actually on you to have proof before you speak, i.e. be objective. Convince me. Convince others, should they choose to engage with your ... tone. Show the connective tissue.

You think there's a deficiency in the design, fine, but you're supposed to produce the calculations (or at least the results), you're supposed to find the supporting information, not me, not anybody else.

When I said I hadn't seen any punching shear calculations in the thread here, then you seize on this as somehow like it's me being deceptive, or confused, and point at the WJE seminar, which I hadn't seen. Just. Not. The. Case.

When I talk about calculations, I mean the full calculation, as in the level of detail that would be in a calculation package, not the result only or a demand/capacity ratio that's quite fuzzy on what exactly was done in the calculation (WJE has presented the results of their analysis, not the full calculations that produce the analysis, you can recreate them, at least potentially, provided you get the right phi (0.75 for shear in ACI 318-77), the right depth, the right strength of concrete, the right load factors and loads, and you correctly interpret when they are not using the phi or load factors, which cover they are using, etc., so can I, but they've not published them, nor has anybody else, up to now, as of your post like yesterday), that's why I said "I haven't seen any calculations".

This is what you said earlier:

I saw the notes from Gary Klein that Morabito had in their file structural analysis software data printouts that indicated punching shear deficiencies with the original design. I have not seen any information regarding why Morabito didn't take action regarding these data printouts. It's possible, but they were not using the software with that purpose, and simply did not look at all of the data printouts, I have no idea anything I would say would be conjecture.

You're apparently referring to the WJE slide in the presentation as "notes from Gary Klein", rather than some published notes elsewhere. Fine. That isn't how I'd describe a slide from a presentation, I thought you were saying there was something published elsewhere.

So, just to clarify, here's what I wrote:

The punching shear calculations presented by WJE are along column line T. This area does not appear to have failed during the collapse, at any point...
Unless I understand WJE wrong...

It's clear that I'm talking about Line T. You were talking about what Morabito had. That's where WJE presents Morabito's output. You were talking about Morabito there. That's what I'm responding to.

You must understand WJE wrong, their entire presentation focuses in on K13.1. it's even on the screenshot you have. Their calculations are not for column line T? Based on the label on their table and their discussion, the "as design" column calc is back in 1980 utilizing calculations from ACI 318-77. For their "at collapse" calculation, their dead load includes the weight from the 96 renovations.

I don't understand WJE wrong. You're not understanding what I'm talking about and skipping over what I wrote.

Again, I'll say it again, the calculations you were referring to, the ones WJE says Morabito had, and I'm talking about in the quote above, is for Column Line T. This is not where anyone has suggested collapse initiated. I'm talking about this because you mention Morabito had these calculations but didn't fix the pool/plaza deck. This is inaccurate. The calculations they had were for Line T, where there's modifications taking place, and Morabito reinforced the structure.

You think you're catching me "confused" but that's not the case, you're narrowing your interpretation to something that fits your view so you can argue it. This is a discussion, not an argument. You have a coherent paragraph here, "Morabito had in their file..... Morabito didn't take action...." what's being misrepresented here is WJE says Morabito had calculations for Line T, and there is reinforcing on the Phase IIc drawings in this area (you show it in your diagram, when you responded to me, the backwards red revision cloud). This whole paragraph is demonstrably false, as written. What I guess you did is jumped to another discussion entirely after that first sentence, which was about Line T, and now are claiming Morabito ignored a punching shear deficiency in the plaza that they had in their calculations. This doesn't seem to be anything WJE said, and it doesn't appear to be anywhere in the discussion here, or elsewhere, so please present your source, or clarify. As I see this now, this is either careless writing or an error in your thinking, or, as you say, conjecture. I haven't seen anybody say Morabito had calculations for punching shear in the plaza/pool deck area.

I guess I'll just start over from the top. There's little point discussing your latest rather condescending post when 80% of the erm, "discussion" there stems from misunderstandings or misinterpretations of what I wrote before. Despite what I said, I'm going to put forth my findings that to me, pretty clearly contradict many of your assertions.

Well for the engineer in the '90s that added additional deadload (sic); that action would have required them to analyze enough of the existing structure down to grade to satisfy that the existing structure could satisfactorily carry the additional loads. If that analysis was performed correctly, it would have included the punching shear check at the deck to column connections. That check would have identified a gross under design (especially relative to prescriptive code requirements) and likely would have triggered temporary shoring and strengthening to increase the punching shear capacity at the columns.

This is a nice, convenient, and comforting thought, but I'm not remotely convinced it's accurate. I haven't seen anything definitive about added dead load on the plaza, not that I've read all 18 sequences of the discussion here, or read all the permit documents, but I don't recall seeing that. WJE showed in their slide:

Source: WJE 9:13

I'm not going to name the 1996 engineer here, mostly because they appear to be still alive, but also because WJE blurred out their name. I don't know why exactly they did that, but fine.

While WJE claims "added dead load" e.g. paver installation, the document they blur out (the engineer's certification letter on the repairs in the parking garage) says nothing about paver installation. So was the 1996 engineer aware of that part? It's not in their certification. The document WJE blurs out and obscures doesn't mention paver installation, so that's a false accusation already. The document they reference sure looks like that engineer's involvement was constrained to just the parking garage. There is no definitive proof that engineer knew of the added weight, particularly in light of the repair they certified is being done is in the parking garage. The permit does list the engineer and disclose paver installation.

Anyway, if you are aware of some document, somewhere, indicating dead load being added, proving that the 1996 engineer knew about it, please present it. Your desire to lay this at the feet of what appears to be a spalling repair in the parking garage, well, I don't see any evidentiary support for it. That seems really inaccurate and unsupported by any documentation I've seen. Is this your opinion based on independent verification, or is it based on the say-so of WJE?

Source: WJE 9:30

This is incredibly deceptive on WJE's part. Flat out. The only documentation on the engineer's involvement indicates structural concrete repair in the parking garage, then they put up a slide saying "under the supervision of an engineer, Paver installation", and put the certification language that directly contradicts their claim, then throw up a cross section that shows the pool deck, where it's not even remotely clear that engineer was involved.

[Side note regarding the truth, from 1931.]

This is what an infinite budget review of documentation produces... an intern spends a week mapping parking spots to columns in videos online [with perhaps zero involvement of the professional engineer in responsible charge] and nobody can be bothered to read a 23 page document. And then somebody watches the presentation and takes it as fact without any review.

WJE says there was a layer of sand and pavers "added" (9:25) but WJE doesn't present a document showing that (the bundle of pages with the 1996 engineer does mention interlocking pavers, but again, that document is a permit document from the contractor, pretty clear the engineer had no involvement in the preparation of that document). Just because they put the engineer's name on the permit doesn't mean the engineer is on for the full scope. I'd be surprised if the engineer ever saw that permit application, and their certification letter certainly does NOT reflect the purported scope of work the contractor put in the permit (no mention of planter waterproofing, no mention of paver installation being "done in compliance" with the SFBC.

And if the engineer is supposed to be certifying the plaza and the paver installation, the city didn't make that happen. So, yeah.

The satellite imagery isn't of a quality to show pavers or not prior to 1996, even if it were better quality distinguishing mortar set tile versus interlocking pavers from a satellite photo seems a bit of an adventure. Still, it seems a bit odd they would be added and there's no documentation on it. What if there were pavers and sand there prior, and the repair work took portions of it up to repair waterproofing? The documents show pavers, sure, but there's no indication the engineer knew about it.

The engineering certification I looked at mentioned a spalling repair of 20 ft² on what sounds like the underside, where exactly is not stated, it says "waterproofing of the deck" and doesn't give any column line references and there's no map. It doesn't mention adding sand and pavers, either. One might be tempted to presume it was the plaza deck, that seems reasonable, but that's not actually in evidence (In fact, the March 22, 1996 letter from Western Waterproofing says "concrete structural repair in the parking garage", and goes on to identify the person and say they've been retained "to do the inspections and supervise the project").

There's a mention of waterproofing in the engineer's certification, but that would be above the topping, would it not, and given the spalling is in the parking garage, wouldn't the waterproofing be there as well?

Both the pool deck and the parking garage (from the Morabito cores) have a topping slab (according to WJE 12:06). Wouldn't the waterproofing layer be atop that?

Now to the unfounded allegations/speculation/conjecture:

From the WJE presentation, they think the original designer knew about the topping slab. There's no evidentiary support for that, but they think the original engineer (Breitermann) knew about it (12:40). No facts in evidence to support that, that's speculative, but fine. The other explanation is they didn't know and the contractor added it, and/or the Architect knew and authorized the "add" but didn't bother to inform the engineer. Or the Architect ordered it, or the contractor added it out of the goodness of their own heart for no obvious reason (rather unlikely given the cost), but didn't they have an on-site mixer? (I'm going to point at Station Square, 1988, where the contractor added a lot of concrete weight to an already not-great structural design, and it collapsed on opening day, the engineer (and maybe the architect) were unaware of the added weight, the engineer understood the added width of the walkway was to be done with extra insulation). I don't think anybody involved in this project is alive, not the original project.

If the topping slab is already there in 1996, under a mortared down tile, how's the second engineer supposed to know it's there? When the architectural/structural cross section shows mortar and tile and concrete? I'm not even sure the 1996 engineer had any of the drawings, nobody has said that, either.

Then there's sand and pavers. The 1996 work WJE didn't really demonstrate anything at all as to what was done and where, unless you're counting what could be replacement pavers, or that the engineer was never aware of the sand and pavers, or was even involved in the plaza/pool deck at all. Considering the level of reputational damage being levied at the unnamed engineer, this should have had much much more evidentiary support.

Without conceding the hypothetical (i.e. the 1996 engineer knew about the added weight of the pavers):

There would be no particular reason for a structural analysis when the pavers are being removed and replaced with similar weight items, particularly if there's no knowledge of the (not designed for) topping slab. It does appear the sand and pavers were added at this time, the extent isn't clear from the permit.

Even if the 1996 engineer knew there was a topping slab, I'm not convinced that would be enough to trigger an engineer to run calculations. If dead load is being added, I would like to have seen calculations, but I'm not convinced anybody in 1996 either knew the topping slab was added and not designed for, or that the engineer was aware of the added sand and pavers. It looks like the City was aware of the interlocking pavers being added, that's about it, they might have missed there's a parking garage under it, at which point they would be unconcerned with "adding" pavers to a slab on ground.

There isn't definitive documentation either way that I've seen. It seems like sand and pavers were added, but it doesn't seem like the 1996 engineer knew about it, (the certification is for the spalling repair, in the parking garage), and if they did, it's possible they did check the punching shear and it worked because they didn't have the topping slab in the calculation, because they didn't know about it, and because they'd have used the cover "as specified".

I saw the notes from Gary Klein that Morabito had in their file structural analysis software data printouts that indicated punching shear deficiencies with the original design. I have not seen any information regarding why Morabito didn't take action regarding these data printouts. It's possible, but they were not using the software with that purpose, and simply did not look at all of the data printouts, I have no idea anything I would say would be conjecture.

Source; WJE seminar, 14:50

According to WJE the software is Sp-slab, (formerly ADOSS), it's possible this isn't using the "as-built" phi, for one.

The shear calculations you say Morabito "had" were, as I already said, NOT on the portion of the building that failed (presumably the plaza, per WJE). WJE presented analysis results (from Morabito) on Line T. You keep claiming "indicates punching shear deficiencies with the original design", this is not a line that failed, and as far as anything I've seen, that area did not collapse. It's on the far West side of the building where the building did not collapse (until it was intentionally demolished). This Line T is checked, for a changed condition that Morabito is analyzing, because (I think) they're cutting in a new exit/entrance to the below grade garage. They are doing these calculations due to the changed conditions, i.e. redesign, not as part of recertification. As far as recertification goes, this is unnecessary. The work is being folded in with the recertification. With the changed support conditions, Morabito appears to have performed a strength check, and reinforced it for the changed loads, hence the drop slabs in this area. Also note there's an unbalanced moment and a gammav, so this is not a "pure" punching shear check.

What I particularly take issue with is your claim:

I have not seen any information regarding why Morabito didn't take action regarding these data printouts. It's possible, but they were not using the software with that purpose, and simply did not look at all of the data printouts, I have no idea anything I would say would be conjecture.

Unless you jumped topics mid-paragraph, or I missed WJE saying there are Morabito calcs for the plaza/pool, this is really misleading and inaccurate. In the previous sentence, the data you are discussing is for Line T, in your later post you show where there's column/slab joint reinforcing on Line T. This is where Morabito had calculation results showing a punching shear deficiency (whether it's "as designed by Breitermann" or due to changed conditions nobody has said. Morabito took action on the area they identified as needing reinforcement on Line T. So they did take action.

 

[davefitz]

AS you would expect, Florida pased new laws and regulations that now require the condos within 6 miles of the ocean have routine inspections and require the condo HOA's to provide sufficient cash reserves to implement all fixes that are recommended by the inspectors. Those requirements have led to huge increases in condo HOA special assessments, and most owners cannot afford the new fees. It implies a lot of condo associations will default and the buildings will either be sold at a discount or demolished.

As I recall, there is an alternate type of concrete/ stucco that is essentially impervious to chloride migration to the rebar- it is a type of geopolymer cement, and that 15 yrs ago the florida DOT had tested adding a geopolymer stucco to the concrete based bridges that span salt water creeks .

"...when logic, and proportion, have fallen, sloppy dead..." Grace Slick

 

[davefitz]

Here is a link to one of the few companies that sell geopolymer stucco in the USA:

https://www.geopolymertech.com/st200-stucco/.

It has much lower porosity than portland cement stucco and might achieve adequate mitigation against chloride corrosion to the embedded rebar.


"...when logic, and proportion, have fallen, sloppy dead..." Grace Slick

 

[lexpatrie]

Here I've been deliberately avoiding this particular forum for almost a month to avoid getting dragged into a massive non-paying debate... I guess for no reason. Oh well.

Yeah Dave, except the seminar from WJE didn't really commit to their being a massive chloride penetration and corrosion problem (they probably discuss it as "depth of carbonation" .... given that you've been a long-term contributor to the site, I think your product plug (a term I use loosely for lack of a better suited word that is more even-handed) seems sincerely intended. I can't speak to WJE having sufficient access to the totality of the evidence that would justify their comment about a lack of corrosion, but that's what we have to work with until further notice.

There are things that look like they could have been done better, (with infinite hindsight), even if they didn't directly cause failure or had a minor contribution, this could be part of the toolset for future more successful projects. I'm not sure it's something you really want to use as a "concrete replacement", (stucco is cementitious but it's not full on concrete, per se) but that's on the design engineer to determine. There's at least potentially some borderline precedent for cementitious versus full on concrete as we use non-shrink non-expansive grout under large steel base plates for steel construction sitting on concrete footings and pile caps.

They could also consider GRFP bars, or carbon fiber reinforcing bars, I forget if they make stainless steel rebar, but I think they do (since it conducts less heat, for one), (personally epoxy coated rebar is just forcing the nick in the coating to concentrate the corrosion, but that's a personal concern, not something I've seen actually documented in published reports), galvanized rebar is possible but to me that's a life extension, not necessarily what we are after as once the zinc is gone, the corrosion proceeds as normal. Trying to produce more impervious concrete, active anti-corrosion protection, corrosion inhibitors, monitoring, etc., are also worthy of consideration.

I would imagine there are also similarly defective buildings that were demolished before problems showed up.

Complicated, interdisciplinary subject.

 

[FacEngrPE]

If we go on the tangent of tools available now, that were not when this structure was designed, ACI 318-19 presents four different exposure categories, one specifically addresses chloride exposure. Better information in the concrete specification makes it more likely an appropriate concrete mix will be designed. Ref

https://theconstructor.org/concrete/concrete-durability-requirements/39036/

 

[lexpatrie]

That's true, I suppose, but if you watch the WJE presentation they somewhere in there say there wasn't significant corrosion anywhere, (unless I'm remembering wrong).

Saltwater effects would be a concern in a new design, or a potential concern, but rubber hits the road it seems the deicing salts used up North are far more detrimental to concrete than "natural" saltwater. I would imagine the concentration of salt ions plays a role, possibly orders of magnitude higher in the North?

 

[JohnRBaker]

While not 'directly' related to the Champlain Towers collapse, this issue has certainly been exacerbated by that incident:

A reckoning is coming for Florida's condo owners as buildings face millions in repairs

New laws in the wake of the 2021 collapse of the Champlain Towers have priced out some retirees, who are scrambling to afford hefty repair bills.

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/ec...rs-buildings-face-millions-repairs-rcna165764

An excerpt from the above item:

After five decades working as a teacher and school administrator, Janet Stone envisioned a relaxing retirement in her condo overlooking Florida’s Atlantic coast.

Instead, she’s gone back to work teaching preschoolers with disabilities and living with her son in Las Vegas to pay off a $100,000 bill from her condo association — her portion of a multimillion-dollar project to replace the 53-year-old building’s deteriorating concrete.

“I shouldn’t say it, but it really sucks to work every day and not have a cent and have to wonder, ‘Can I afford groceries this week?’” said Stone, who purchased her condo in Ormond Beach, Florida, for $400,000 in 2021. “Every penny I make goes towards that concrete restoration.”

Across Florida, aging condo buildings are facing rising expenses and millions of dollars in structural repairs to comply with new regulations following the collapse of the Champlain Towers condominium, which killed 98 people in 2021. While new building requirements are intended to prevent a similar tragedy, the costs are pushing some condo owners to the brink financially and jeopardizing one of the last bastions of relatively affordable housing along Florida’s coastline.

John R. Baker, P.E. (ret)
Irvine, CA
Siemens PLM:

The secret of life is not finding someone to live with
It's finding someone you can't live without

 

[RVAmeche]

I don't see it mentioned in the article right away, but is the implication that all the tenant HOA fees goes to normal maintenance and they don't have bigger pots for larger repairs? Or did they HOA blow money for decades and is now relying on the tenants to bail out the building?

 

[Sym P. le]

As I understand it, each condo entity runs its own business as it sees fit.

 

[JohnRBaker]

The community where we live also has an HOA, and as the owner of our home, we pay a monthly fee, and as such, we get a financial report each year (as required by state law). The fiscal year ends in July and we won't get this past year's report for another few months or so. However, I just looked at the annual report ending in July 2023 and it showed that maintenance expenses for the year was something over $100,000. Our community consists of 135 single-family homes and the HOA is responsible for maintaining only the common areas, which includes the streets, greenbelts, the four privacy gates, the pool & Jacuzzi, and two tennis courts (which are almost exclusively used as Pickle Ball courts now). With that in mind, as of July 2023, we had $1.3 million in our reserve account. Now this past year's expenses will be somewhat higher than the previous year since they repaired and extensively remodeled the four privacy gates. On average, it seems that the association takes on one major project about every two years or so. For example, a few years ago, they completely redid the pool area including new furniture and gas grills. And a couple of years ago, they resurfaced our streets (this is something which is done every six years or so). While our monthly association fees are not insignificant, we do feel that we're getting what we're paying for, and as such, the values of our and our neighbor's homes have been going up well ahead of average (compared to what we paid for our house in 1987, it's now worth something close to eight-times as much).

John R. Baker, P.E. (ret)
Irvine, CA
Siemens PLM:

The secret of life is not finding someone to live with
It's finding someone you can't live without

 

[Murph 9000]

I don't see it mentioned in the article right away, but is the implication that all the tenant HOA fees goes to normal maintenance and they don't have bigger pots for larger repairs? Or did they HOA blow money for decades and is now relying on the tenants to bail out the building?

I don't know if it applies in this case, but a common cause of condo owners being hit by these huge assessments is failing to build up a proper reserve fund over the life of the complex. In the past, the condo boards were able to vote on how much of the reserves they would fund, and sometimes voted for 0%. I believe that was part of the problem with Champlain Towers South, they had voted against reserve funding over the years, to keep fees down, so any major work resulted in an immediate substantial charge to the owners. It was looking like the law was going to change towards requiring a fully funded reserve after the CTS disaster. The theory is that they conduct periodic reserve studies to predict future maintenance expenses, and put the money aside over time such that it's no big deal when the work comes around. If the roof needs replaced every 15 years, they estimate the future cost and collect that over time, then the work just goes ahead when it's needed with either no or minimal charge at the time.

Previous reporting suggested that voting against reserve funding was common practice for Florida condos. It's essentially people being extremely short term in their thinking, and penny pinching the budget to the bare minimum.

 

[LittleInch]

"people being extremely short term in their thinking" - Well if you think you only have 5 years left on the planet, why budget for something in 25 years time???

This affects lots of places where people don't want to fund their buyers future maintenance fund.

Big blocks are really a declining asset and if you get 50 years form such a building you're doing well. The real estate market though doesn't think like that though the size of the repair fund might start being investigated a bit more by buyers?? Hence driving down prices.

Remember - More details = better answers
Also: If you get a response it's polite to respond to it.

 

[davefitz]

A similar sort of condo conundrum is playing out in Honolulu,Hawaii, but without the consternation that developed in Florida. Perhaps 20 years ago the US supreme court ruled that the hawaiian rules which mandated that only native hawaiians could own the land under properties was struck down. One result is that all of the developed condos and hotels that were leasing the land under the structure realized that after their 50 yr lease was over, the land could now be purchased by international investors. The 50 yr life of ocean front property had been a legal fact of life for over 40 yrs , so the value of such condominiums was well known to drop as their legal ( and useful) life was known to end in the period 2020-2033. The bottom line is that a hawaiain condo that only has 7 yrs left in its land lease has a suitably reduced sale price.

"...when logic, and proportion, have fallen, sloppy dead..." Grace Slick

 

[masonrygeek]

Also look at the problems in the UK with unsafe metal cladding on their buildings. The Grenfell fire of 2017 caused many building owners to reclad their buildings and putting most of the costs on renters and owners. Most can't afford the millions of dollars it will take to fix the problem. Check out

https://endourcladdingscandal.org/

to see the sad situation people are in from using thin metal cladding (and associated problems with firestopping).

 

[lexpatrie]

John - that article is indicating a more-or-less causal relationship between that "new" regulation and the CTS collapse.

As a side note, I believe there was something similar perhaps a decade back, which was eventually dismantled by the government after a few years, had that legislation been in place for ten years, well, results may have varied.

While it does seem like CTS was underfunded, I'm not positive that's the case, (if the records show a long history of large "special assessments" that would suggest poor reserve practices, but again, these folks serve limited terms and righting the ship, financially, involves increases that might be unwelcome, and if they are really unwelcome, they can lose their seat and somebody less financially disciplined can replace them. I'm not proficient in how much oversight these boards and their reserves receive). It's an interesting question, but I haven't seen any reporting on the subject, which suggests either nobody has bothered, or there's nothing much to find. The board did get named in the (I'll call it wrongful death) lawsuit, but civil litigation you name everybody and "let god sort them out" at the onset.

They got stuck with a pretty large repair scope, (they also paid over half a million to Morabito for the recertification bid drawings, (unlikely this was planned for), which, incidentally, weren't done? weren't complete? (and even that, probably, would not have addressed some of the underlying issues, particularly due to the "it's fine" recertification language at the time, (I refer you to archive.org for that, if you are interested, it has been revised a bit since) as well as the extent of the review performed by the design firm for recertification. Recertification, to me, is oddly fixated on windows, doors, and electrical.

Overall, a "reserve study" should be performed periodically as part of responsible board behaviour, GAAP, whatever, regardless of some abstruse statute.

If said individual bought a condo for $400k and didn't do the research to see where things were regarding maintenance, well, their Realtor (TM) sucked.

 

[lexpatrie]

As a side note, for the interested, Part 4 had the reserve study, as a link on this web site, the source itself is unclear, so it can't be confirmed as legit.

Search for:
"Document with work to be preformed. Where is the major structural work?"

 

[lexpatrie]

For those who are interested, "Northern" corrosion and spalling of concrete.

Not exactly on topic here, but for comparison, say, to the Miami area for ocean spray, versus what one presumes is at least partially de-icing salt, though I can't say how much maintenance this pedestrian crossing bridge received, maybe it gets a lot of de-icing love during the winter.

I took these pictures from in front of the barricade, not sure why it's closed off, probably as maintenance is planned versus a full-on concern with structure, as there's a working freeway this goes over.

 

[dik]

Concrete cover appears to be way too little.

-----*****-----
So strange to see the singularity approaching while the entire planet is rapidly turning into a hellscape. -John Coates

-Dik