Perhaps we can call this sort of an executive summary of the potential list of rabbit holes that need to be pursued with factual data verification where possible, now that all evidence is in the form of the most complex puzzle you can imagine.
So are we now peeling back the layers of that ‘Onion Razor’ such that we can see there are many plausible contributing ‘stacking’ factors to the sudden collapse of CTS?
I am sure I will miss some of the many factors identified so far, and mis-quote some too, but here is a shotgun quick attempt for consideration. So don’t shoot the messenger…..
1 Subsidence of perhaps piles or columns/foundations, along with increased content of water around garage slab and tub walls?
2 Or perhaps a leaky Surfside Storm and Sewer System/CTS tie-in back flowing around CTS when tides are high?
3 Perhaps the collapsed portion of the CTS RC buildings was designed and constructed on the on the thinnest of margins, which means it was flexing more from wind, vibrations, and asymmetric additional loading of a less than a best practices RC structure? What was the natural frequency of structure and it was surely changing over time as it was flexed, stressed and loaded with new loads.
4 Perhaps pile-driving, roof loading, roof vibrations, roof damage and repairs, poor quality concrete repairs, lack of timely and true root cause structural and water proofing repairs, lack of structural supporting of lower floors during repairs, asymmetric loading of adjacent deflected two way slabs with week slab to column connections, recent rain loading,. I would argue garage ceiling band-aid crack filing actually made things worse rather than better, as rain water had to now find another path thru the garage ceiling, thus crack some more concrete to seek lowest point due to gravity.
5. Starting on the Roof when it was known that pool deck was ticking time bomb, because working at ground level parking deck created a logistics challenge.
6 All of the factors continuing to weaken and loosen up the RC structure?
7 Demolition of CMU non-load bearing walls in some units that perhaps had been providing lateral support to the insufficient lateral bracing flat plate slab and column connections or perhaps was additional lateral bracing the designer was counting on to prevent racking of structure? So not truly non-load bearing from a lateral support function.
8 Navy 3.9 after shock could have contributed a little to a very weak structure.
9 Which might lead one to say Roof work was final insult?
10 Palm Tree loading of concrete structural slab, with roots growing into cracks of concrete deck, and continuing to cause the crack to grow wider, and of course they how were they removed? Roots will chase water sources, but in a sewer pipe that tend to grow in length and fill the volume of the pipe, not necessarily cracking the pipe or at least in my soil which provides lateral support of outside of pipe.
11 Low spots in pictures of patio deck indicate perhaps uneven settling or corrosion of some of the concrete columns supporting deck, other wise deck should be perfectly flat as built?
12 One question is why would it take 40 years to delaminate the patio deck slab sufficiently to cause collapse? It would seem the standing water under tile and sand would never really dry out, except perhaps during a long dry spell?
13 Perhaps this exercise is a waste of time, but it seems compiling a list of really plausible contribution factors and perhaps ranking them or trying to quantify them is similar to what Maud is compiling with her witness statements data base.
Now I am not Volunteering to be the book or gate keeper, so if someone else wants to do that great. I am more of a one and done guy, with perhaps some edits as the memory ‘pixels’ wake up….then I move on to my next interest…..Currently it is my long honey do list…. BTW, I did not re-read this post, so forgive the typo's...
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