Disastrous trafo failure in Russia 15

[edison123]

BBC reports

At least 54 people are missing after an explosion at Russia's largest hydro-electric power station killed eight workers, investigators say.

The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya power station in Siberia happened when an oil-filled transformer exploded in a turbine hall, they added.

This damaged the wall and ceiling of the turbine hall which then flooded.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/europe/8204860.stm

Aren't oil filled trafos banned in the generator/turbine halls to eliminate exactly this type of disaster ?

 

[ScottyUK]

"Stations of comparable size in the USA, Canada, Brasil etc have a different attitude and culture to safety."

Over here there is the belief at senior level that reams of paper risk assessments and method statements will somehow provide protection. Protection from litigation perhaps. The real key to safety isn't paperwork, it is carefully designed and engineered plant to eliminate or minimise risks so far as possible, and experienced well-trained staff who understand the hazards and how to work safely with them who make the difference.

While I agree that at a governmental and corporate level there are some big differences in attitude between Russia and some Western nations, I've found that many of the Eastern Bloc engineers are better educated and better trained that their western equivalents. Western power plants of recent years are built down to a price, not up to a standard, and while maintenance outage intervals are being extended the overhaul work carried out is being pared to the absolute minimum, something we have the beancounters to thank for. Our plants and staff aren't so much better built, better maintained, or better staffed that we can afford to assume that the Russian accident couldn't happen here.


----------------------------------

If we learn from our mistakes I'm getting a great education!

 

[edison123]

plants of recent years are built down to a price, not up to a standard, and while maintenance outage intervals are being extended the overhaul work carried out is being pared to the absolute minimum, something we have the beancounters to thank for.

Well said, Scotty. One must learn from such disasters instead of being complacently dismissive about them. That's why I am frustrated by the complete news black-out of this terrible accident with loss of precious lives. Pete nailed it with the media's obsession with ridiculous persons and events.

Muthu

http://www.edison.co.in

 

[rasevskii]

For niallnz:

Yes I agree that the translation to costcutting must mean instead upgrade, refurbish, or modernization. Or something similar.

Looking at the gv control diagram, it appears that the gv are controlled in groups of three by one master servo. I think that there are 30 gv therefore 10 groups. The master servo for each group is likely an intelligent linear actuator, itself controlled by a digital protocol.

I have researched out the likely supplier of this system and downloaded some info. We cannot publish that here of course. It is the type of system widely used in machine tool controls and other industrial applications.

Agreed that likely the regulating parameters, opening and closing speeds, etc, are protocol controlled. A VERY dangerous method. The gv slew speed should be limited by hydraulic means only.

What is incredible is that there was -?- no sort of overriding safety system, no purely hydraulic-mechanical overspeed device, etc, that would shut the gv directly even if all the electronics had failed.

Also the intake gate should have dropped upon ESD condition, apparently this was not operational or not foreseen.

The electronic system would have been likely located at generator top level, and supplied from the station DC via a UPS or similar, possibly with multiple backup supply. However, no one was expecting the station to flood, and all electric supply to be lost.

But this would not be the first hydroplant to flood. I can think of one plant that flooded to the level of the crane rails, submerging 3 units. A few decades ago...

I agree with your view on the culture of safety, maybe there it was a culture of complacency...

regards, rasevskii

 

[slavag]

Hi.
Please see new photos

http://drugoi.livejournal.com/3032285.html.

Scotty!!!Star

 

[edison123]

Thanks Slavag for that link.

It's a terrible accident. The main culprit seems to have been just one machine but with incredible collateral damages.

The missing carne rail mystery is solved for me. One end of the crane beam is supported on a gantry, which travels on the walkway. Never seen anything like it before.

Poignant comment from one of the survivors:

And now he can not stand the sound of water flowing from the tap.


Muthu

http://www.edison.co.in

 

[MattNCSU03]

I received this from a coworker today, didn't see it referenced in anyone’s posts so thought I would share. I apologize if it is covered by one of the links people posted, as I have not had a chance to browse them yet.

Attached is a PowerPoint file (in the zip archive) that contains annotated photos and theories as to what caused the accident.

 

[oldfieldguy]

Matt--

Thanks for the file.

old field guy

 

[wolf39]

The discussion now seems to concentrate on the studs holding down the turbine cover. Quite a few failed by breaking. The fine thread of other studs propable were out of tolerance or simply rusted away. With about 20 bars present at rated head, and even more under the circumstances present when unit 2 failed, the nuts may have popped away thus giving way for the flood water. See for post 9654 of

http://forums.drom.ru/hakasiya/t1151239745-p483.html

Regards

Wolf

http://WWW.HYDROPOWER-CONSULT.COM

 

[wolf39]

There are some in-house videos available under

http://rutube.ru/tracks/2338600.html

Regards

Wolf

http://WWW.HYDROPOWER-CONSULT.COM

 

[wolf39]

Should we start to worry?

See for post 13845 of

http://forums.drom.ru/hakasiya/t11512397-p693.html

Also see

http://www.izvestia.ru/obshestvo/article3132864/

and

http://www.krasrab.com/archive/2009/09/09/06/view_article

Regards

Wolf

http://WWW.HYDROPOWER-CONSULT.COM

 

[edison123]

Scary stuff, wolf. Hope the "authorities" involved in this mess are smart enough.

Muthu

http://www.edison.co.in

 

[ScottyUK]

Either the second or third link in Wolf's post triggered my anti-virus - something called bloodhound.exe. Probably not a great thing to have on your computer.


----------------------------------

If we learn from our mistakes I'm getting a great education!

 

[wolf39]

Hi Scotty:

Sorry to hear that you are having problems with your anti-virus protection. My internet security software is being constantly updated when on-line and I had no problems with the links mentioned. Today a complete virus scan after update didn't show any irregularity on my computer.

Regards

Wolf

http://WWW.HYDROPOWER-CONSULT.COM

 

[ScottyUK]

Hi Wolf,

It was at work and corporate IT use Norton which ain't my favourite AV software. Hopefully it's a false alarm. I probably will have to answer some interesting questions about trawling a Russian internet forum, ha-ha.


----------------------------------

If we learn from our mistakes I'm getting a great education!

 

[lz5pl]

For information (probably mostly for Russian-speaking colleagues) here is the official report of investigation authority about the failure on Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP .

http://www.gosnadzor.ru/news/aktSSG___bak.doc

There is a difference from Soviet era - information is public and several officials are pointed out as guilty.

------------------------
It may be like this in theory and practice, but in real life it is completely different.
The favourite sentence of my army sergeant

 

[slavag]

For information too.
For Russian-speaking or used translators,
I would recommend: be carefull with this report.
Lot of technical guys are not agree with this report.
Please see:

http://www.fedpress.ru/federal/econom/tek/id_156975.html

Best Regards.
Slava