I understand better what you meant now.
This "overall pilot skill" issue is why I don't give much credence to kill ratios to determine aircraft performance... Interestingly enough, in Western Europe, kill ratios by the 8th Air Force in 1944 were pretty lopsided, despite the fact that the enemy was mostly fighters. You hear ratios from 3 to 20+ to one, 3 being the P-38, and 20+ being the P-51...
But the P-38 had high altitude problems and training issues, and was grossly outnumbered initially, while the P-51 arrived in large numbers quite a bit later, and just at the right time to look infinitely better than it actually was...
This lopsided ratio in favour of the P-51 has at least two major contributing factors: The number of P-51 "Ace in a day" soared in May 1944, just as the P-47 was being massively shifted to low altitude ground attack (to prepare D-Day), and, coincidentally, this was also the time where the P-51 was finally vastly outnumbering the P-47, at a rapid rate, for high altitude bomber escort duties, after being a quite a minority element in the 8th Air Force for the first four months of 1944. (The P-47 got 160 of the 220 air to air kills of late February's "Big Week" -the remaining 60 being split between the P-38 and P-51!-, despite the P-47's short range with no wing drop tanks, only a belly drop tank!)
Why where the P-51 kills suddenly soaring in May of 1944? Amazingly enough, the cause was two major doctrinal changes occurring at the exact same time, one Allied, one German, the German one probably being the more important:
-The Allied change was the Doolittle order to free the escort fighters from "shadowing" the bombers, instead allowing them to range ahead and sweep the sky ahead of the bombers, making it possible to disrupt enemy fighter formations as they were assembling (also giving the interceptors less time to climb up to the high bombers, given the much higher speed of the now unhindered escort fighters)
-The German change was even more significant: It was the catastrophic "Bombers only" directive of May 1944 (which was never relaxed, but probably followed more "loosely" later) that treated the Luftwaffe as essentially an "expendable" arm: German fighters were to ignore enemy escort fighters and concentrate on the bombers, in doing so enormously boosting US escort fighter confidence... As Galland said: "If I understand this well, the safest place in the sky is now in an American fighter cockpit..." Very little remaining overhead fighter cover was allowed to the German fighter pilots, who, amazingly enough, were obedient enough to let this order take full effect for a good while, allowing themselves to be slaughtered on a mass scale...
Many inexperienced P-51 pilots suddenly came back in May with almost unheard-of strings of five kills or more: This shows how profoundly doctrine permeates down to the tactical level...
When the air fighting shifted to lower altitudes, around D-Day in June 1944, these two new doctrinal attitudes lost quite a bit of their significance, since the altitude advantage (and large bomber streams) played a lesser role in tactical frontline fighting: As a consequence, the kill/loss ratio changed dramatically in the other direction: A figure I read claimed the exchange ratio was around 1:1 over France, despite worsening German training...
This is why many of the "ace in a day" occurences within the 8th Air Force are noticeably clustered around May of 1944...
Popular lore has it that the Luftwaffe barely showed up over the Normandy invasion front: In fact, it expended an enormous and unprecedented effort for months, but the vulnerability of its large bases, and the short range of its fighters, required dispersion in forward airfields, and the poor communications available in these forward fields, plus the numerical disadvantage, made the defense uncoordinated and diluted. Many of them just flew round and round not knowing where the action was...
If anything, I would say pilot skill is slightly overrated as a factor, at least for low-altitude fighting, which seems easier to master for a novice: In US combat reports of late 1944, I noticed that German pilots, who had to be less experienced for the most part, were actually giving more trouble against worse odds if they were at low altitudes: One of the reasons is they were flying more of the more maneuverable FW-190As... The FW-190A grew to represent 70% of the Western Front fighter force as 1944 dragged on...
But their tactical choices seemed better too, in late 1944, than in early 1944: The Luftwaffe institution as a whole gradually seemed to have learned how to fight US fighters by September, and despite having less well trained pilots, they were apparently giving them better advice. It's only when massively attacking high altitude bombers again in November (there was a sort of "resurgence" of the anti-bomber effort twice in November: Two occasions were the largest intercepting fleets ever were assembled: 600 + fighters) that the losses again became terrible: With big bombers around, the "bombers only" directive again took its toll...
These two failed November "mini Big Blows" were what killed off Adolf Galland's "Big Blow" idea of concentrating 1500+ fighters against the bombers: In the end, this preserved assembled force was used on the low-altitude "Boddenplate", but it had been trained for high-altitude fighting, which apparently did cause problems: It does show training does matter, but probably not to a hugely greater extent than doctrine...
In my view, "Boddenplate" was probably a better idea if the force had been trained for it, and if the effort could have been repeated (note the "exchange ratio" of "Boddenplatte" was still around 1:1, despite all the problems), leaving the high altitude bombers for the Flak or their jets. I think the Germans simply could not compete at high altitudes, where pilot training indeed seemed to matter more...
Also it so happened that the Luftwaffe's best mass-produced fighter, the FW-190A, was noticeably out of its best element above 20 000 ft: The P-51 seemed comparatively quite at ease in the thin air.
If anyone knows about in-flight wing bending measurements, while turning, on these types of aircrafts, note that I am still interested...
Gaston