LD... some caution/background knowledge RE these research papers is required.
They were written by researches that made some fundamental errors in the 'best practices' of riveted assembly with fay-sealant; and other researchers seemed to lack a fundamental understanding of how the early Boeing acft fuselages and wings were assembled [707, 720, 727, 737 and KC-135] for air-pressure and fuel tightness. For instance...
Air pressure tightness was assured by wide lap joints [at least 4-fastener-rows] that were tightly fastened together [primer finish only] "otherwise dry'... and that sealant was filleted along the edges of panels as a moisture barrier and secondary air-seal. Also, there was a report... RE the 727 fuselage tear-down fatigue/crack/corrosion findings... that I read in the distant past... there were remarkable differences between the LH and RH fuselage sections that none of the researchers could immediately understand. An old production guy solved the dilemma: there were two [2] separate crews assigned to [hand] build the fuselage cabin sections: a LH crew and a RH crew... who did these jobs for years without mixing. The variation boiled down to minor quality/workmanship practices as emphasized by their crew supervisors.
In the early 1970s my dad converted his Thorp T-18 to 'wet-wings' [for added fuel capacity/range/endurance]. In doing so I was able to have 'first-hand' understanding of the process from the aircraft designer John Thorp... who was already thought thru the process [for Dad] and who was already experienced in the science/art of incorporating integral fuel tanks into GA and military aircraft. After information go-out about use of integral tanks in his [Dad's] aircraft, there were several articles about how bad this was structurally. YES JT was forced to make several structural adjustments to the wing that were not well understood by others... and JT gave very strict instructions 'as to what' specific finishes, pre-cleaning practices, LOW VISCOSITY [PRC] sealants were to be used, specified directions for sealant mixing/use/application/etc... including the need for access doors to allow fillet-seal along part edges and over installed DRIVEN rivets. ETC...
NOTE. My sister was the only one in our family who could actually reach-in and do the hand fillet-seal. She still remembers/hates the smell of uncured sealant and how it stuck to her hands/arms... and the solvents to clean it off.
NOTE.
There are three relatively important documents on sealing processes that help define 'how-to' for best structural durability and long-term sealing durability... along with a host of other 'obscure but critical factors to consider. In the two AIAA JA papers I able to download, NONE of these were cited as fundamental 'how-to references'. I suspect that there would be similar lack of practical understanding/references in the Wiley and Researchgate articles.
AFWAL-TR-87-3078 AIRCRAFT INTEGRAL FUEL TANK DESIGN HANDBOOK
SAE-AIR4069 Sealing of Integral Fuel Tanks [DoD accepted]
SAE-AIR5774 Composite Fuel Tanks, Fuel System Design Considerations
NOTE. MOST companies that pressure-seal cabins and integral tanks have very strict controls to the process... and yes... probably have reduced allowables [static strength and fatigue] even when the process is done properly.
BTW... pressurizing a double-row lap-splice-skin cabin structure is structurally unwise... three or four rivet rows is much better practice. MANY reasons.
Reverse riveting by the 'NACA Method'...brazier heads inside, bucked-tails into countersinks, then mill flush-to-skin [over-coat with CCC]... has been proven 'more fatigue durable' than conventional practices in flush-riveted lap-joints... at greater expense [time]... many reasons.
Regards, Wil Taylor
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