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Air India 787 crashes on take off 7

LittleInch

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A full 787-8 has crashed shortly after take off in ahmedabad.

Basically barely got off the ground then look like its trying to land in this video.


Specualtion that they pulled flaps up instead of gear up and basically didn't have enough lift so it looks like a gentle stall right into a built up area.

Looks to be flaps up, slats/ nose flaps down and gear down which is very odd.
 
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I have clearly read VFSG's are never sharing same bus at same time.

However, I just read that each VFSG contains 3 PMGs. One of which is dedicated to flight controls, and each PMG is independent. So perhaps this could explain our some of our disagreements.

Again :poop: data yields 💩 results.........
 
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The preliminary report has been released.
AAIB homepage (with link to report): https://aaib.gov.in/
Direct link to report: https://aaib.gov.in/What's New Assets/Preliminary Report VT-ANB.pdf
*Edit: The AAIB page is currently not loading, so I've also attached the report PDF to this post*

Probably the most informative excerpt from the report:

The aircraft started rolling at 08:07:37 UTC.

As per the EAFR data, the aircraft crossed the take-off decision speed V1 and achieved 153 kts IAS at 08:08:33 UTC. The Vr speed (155 kts) was achieved as per the EAFR at 08:08:35 UTC. The aircraft air/ground sensors transitioned to air mode, consistent with liftoff at 08:08:39 UTC.

The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off.

In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so.

The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport perimeter wall.

As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.

As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about 08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC) automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.

The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 8:09:11 UTC

At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”. The ATCO enquired about the call sign. ATCO did not get any response but observed the aircraft crashing outside the airport boundary and activated the emergency response.
 

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Now, the question becomes: Did the switches get PHYSICALLY turned off, or was there a wiring fault or electronics fault that mis-detected the switch positions?

Also interesting that there was a Cat C MEL for "Core Network" active at the time. I wonder what that was about....

They also noted that on the 737, there was an Airworthiness Bulletin about fuel cutoff switches potentially being installed "with the locking feature disengaged." Sounds like a pretty serious "mistake" to me. I wonder how similar the switches are on the 787. I can't believe any pilots would NOT report an issue like that if it were present--that's pretty obvious.
 
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It would seem that it would take a very deliberate effort, to shut both switches manually off within 1 second of each other, if locking device installed?

But easy to accomplish if no locking device.
 
If change of switch position was nefarious, intending to put the aircraft in the dirt, this is actually brilliant.

This early in climb out, shutting down engines means that even with switch re-position 10s later, the re-light sequence would start (it did). But AC was descending and re-light process takes some time. At least one engine started to spool back up, but there was simply not enough time to recover.

Other cases of such AC was at altitude and pilot with ill intent had to manage other pilot out of cockpit and lock door behind him.
 
Remember the Alaska Airlines pilot that was tripping on 'shrooms and tried to shut down the engines on the airplane? He said he was trying to pull the red handles. From what I can tell the pilots' fuel cutoff handles are white on the 737.

That brings up the fire suppression system, everything associated with those are typically red. Is there a separate handle that could be pulled for fire suppression that signals a fuel cut?

The one second time difference between the events does make me believe this was human caused now that this information is available.

We have problems with fire suppression systems on the tugboats. They are a single point failure that can shut down both engines except that they do it simultaneously.
 
Here's another possibility: what if something fell on the switches and flipped them off? (I know they are supposed to lock in place, but again there was a comment in the report that does raise questions on whether the locking worked).

I seem to recall a crash of a helicopter a few years ago, where an iPad in the cockpit fell and wedged itself in the pedals, causing a (I believe, fatal) crash.
 
The fact the switches moved in both directions 10 sec apart seems to indicate an actual, manual movement in the cockpit.

I have wondered that from the beginning of this.

Maybe we will get cockpit video now as I can't see how they will ever know.

Rather surprised that this switch issue wasn't checked though.
 
Well, if something fell on the switches and cut off the fuel and I was the pilot, I would definitely reach down and try to re-light the engines... So, that would explain the "both directions" part.
 
First pull the switch out, then move it.


Not a motion that's likely to happen by accident.
 
It would be interesting to know which switch was moved first. I guess the next phase of the investigation will delve into the crews lifes, medical, financial situation. Maybe one of them has a flight simulator in their house that they practiced this on.
 
One of the pilots posts photos of himself with a face mask. That's not a sign of good mental health.
 
Reposting my comment from the Orange Site™ Brought To You By Sauron:

Assuming this is a murder-suicide and not a mistake or malfunction somehow, it's *very* damning of the FAA's policy to revoke the pilot's licenses of anyone seeking treatment for mental health issues. This was in India and thus not FAA jurisdiction, but it still would be a case where an untreated mental health issue lead to hundreds of deaths. By making pilots choose between their careers & medical treatment (since they can't continue as pilots if they seek treatment) the FAA encourages hiding mental illness by pilots. The Pilot Mental Health Campaign has been advocating for legislation to change, HR 2591 the "Mental Health in Aviation Act of 2025" has just been approved by committee for a general vote. I certainly hope it passes, and that other nations with dangerous policies prohibiting pilots from seeking treatment change as well.
 
Reposting my comment from the Orange Site™ Brought To You By Sauron:

Assuming this is a murder-suicide and not a mistake or malfunction somehow, it's *very* damning of the FAA's policy to revoke the pilot's licenses of anyone seeking treatment for mental health issues. This was in India and thus not FAA jurisdiction, but it still would be a case where an untreated mental health issue lead to hundreds of deaths. By making pilots choose between their careers & medical treatment (since they can't continue as pilots if they seek treatment) the FAA encourages hiding mental illness by pilots. The Pilot Mental Health Campaign has been advocating for legislation to change, HR 2591 the "Mental Health in Aviation Act of 2025" has just been approved by committee for a general vote. I certainly hope it passes, and that other nations with dangerous policies prohibiting pilots from seeking treatment change as well.
Indeed. MH370, now at the bottom of an unknown location in the Southern Sea, for one example of several others....
 
One could argue about the actual effectiveness of mental health treatment. There is no cure for mental health issues.
 

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