Cost of noncompliance operations is going up.
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$ 1.6 B Fine
- Thread starter BigInch
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The fine seems to match the level of inadequacies.
The National Transportation Safety Board's investigation found that the rupture of Line 132 was caused by a fracture that originated in the partially welded longitudinal seam of one of six short pipe sections, which are known in the industry as "pups." The fabrication of five of the pups in 1956 would not have met generally accepted industry quality control and welding standards then in effect, indicating that those standards were either overlooked or ignored. The weld defect in the failed pup would have been visible when it was installed. The investigation also determined that a sewer line installation in 2008 near the rupture did not damage the defective pipe.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) (1) inadequate quality assurance and quality control in 1956 during its Line 132 relocation project, which allowed the installation of a substandard and poorly welded pipe section with a visible seam weld flaw that, over time grew to a critical size, causing the pipeline to rupture during a pressure increase stemming from poorly planned electrical work at the Milpitas Terminal; and (2) inadequate pipeline integrity management program, which failed to detect and repair or remove the defective pipe section.
Contributing to the accident were the California Public Utility Commission's (CPUC) and the U.S. Department of Transportation's exemptions of existing pipelines from the regulatory requirement for pressure testing, which likely would have detected the installation defects. Also contributing to the accident was the CPUC's failure to detect the inadequacies of PG&E's pipeline integrity management program.
Contributing to the severity of the accident were the lack of either automatic shutoff valves or remote control valves on the line and PG&E's flawed emergency response procedures and delay in isolating the rupture to stop the flow of gas.
The National Transportation Safety Board's investigation found that the rupture of Line 132 was caused by a fracture that originated in the partially welded longitudinal seam of one of six short pipe sections, which are known in the industry as "pups." The fabrication of five of the pups in 1956 would not have met generally accepted industry quality control and welding standards then in effect, indicating that those standards were either overlooked or ignored. The weld defect in the failed pup would have been visible when it was installed. The investigation also determined that a sewer line installation in 2008 near the rupture did not damage the defective pipe.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) (1) inadequate quality assurance and quality control in 1956 during its Line 132 relocation project, which allowed the installation of a substandard and poorly welded pipe section with a visible seam weld flaw that, over time grew to a critical size, causing the pipeline to rupture during a pressure increase stemming from poorly planned electrical work at the Milpitas Terminal; and (2) inadequate pipeline integrity management program, which failed to detect and repair or remove the defective pipe section.
Contributing to the accident were the California Public Utility Commission's (CPUC) and the U.S. Department of Transportation's exemptions of existing pipelines from the regulatory requirement for pressure testing, which likely would have detected the installation defects. Also contributing to the accident was the CPUC's failure to detect the inadequacies of PG&E's pipeline integrity management program.
Contributing to the severity of the accident were the lack of either automatic shutoff valves or remote control valves on the line and PG&E's flawed emergency response procedures and delay in isolating the rupture to stop the flow of gas.
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- #3
Number 26 says it all....
Why is it so 'effen hard to understand that ancient piping systems run up to and beyond their design pressures constitute a clear and present danger to the public ?
Why is it so hard to understand that some consider it criminal neglect by the federal government when no clear uniform criteria of design, installation and periodic testing uniform across the United States ?
Why can't we do it like they can in Europe ????
MJCronin
Sr. Process Engineer
Why is it so 'effen hard to understand that ancient piping systems run up to and beyond their design pressures constitute a clear and present danger to the public ?
Why is it so hard to understand that some consider it criminal neglect by the federal government when no clear uniform criteria of design, installation and periodic testing uniform across the United States ?
Why can't we do it like they can in Europe ????
MJCronin
Sr. Process Engineer
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- #6
My thoughts on those questions,
1) Why is it so 'effen hard to understand that ancient piping systems run up to and beyond their design pressures constitute a clear and present danger to the public ?
[highlight #3465A4]Pipe is buried, out of sight and out of mind.
[/highlight]
2) Why is it so hard to understand that some consider it criminal neglect by the federal government when no clear uniform criteria of design, installation and periodic testing uniform across the United States ?
CFRs Title 49 Part 192 & 195 (pretty much B31.8 and 4 codes copied into law) now form a uniform basis of minimum requirements across the nation. The problem is it was introduced relatively recently (80's) and it was not strictly applied to existing systems. There are a number of critical exclusions.
3) Why can't we do it like they can in Europe ????
IMO the US codes are more comprehensive (ASME B31) and generally well understood, even on an international basis, so I wouldn't say that it's a code deficiency or code implementation problem.
I think, as bimr's notes are the same points brought up in the judgement, it comes down to inspection and implementation. American business and taxpayers do not like regulations in general, never want them to apply to previous or existing works, nor do they like to pay for inspectors needed to ensure compliance. And engineers are considered overhead. DOT/PHMSA's 139 federal inspection and enforcement staff and over 300 state inspectors are responsible for regulating nearly 3,000 companies. 7 companies per inspector.
Contractors are contractors all around the world and always trying to push limits on specs and short cuts, so I consider that is a wash.
So we are left with implementation and operation. Of those two, geography and market size probably have the most significant effects. From " "America depends on a network of more than 185,000 miles of liquid petroleum pipelines, nearly 320,000 miles of gas transmission pipelines, and more than 2 million miles of gas distribution pipelines to safely and efficiently move energy and raw materials to fuel our nation's economic engine." By contrast, says that there are 33,000 miles of crude oil and product pipelines in the EU and 200,000 KM of gas (124,000 mi). The North Sea has roughly 450 platforms, while the Gulf of Mexico somewhere around 4,000. So I round that out to a US network that is 15X the size of the EU. Considering the number of PHMSA inspectors (439) that's over 5500 miles of pipe per inspector and 6 companies per inspector. A logistics nightmare, even before considering implementing any regulations.
Is there an attitude problem as well? We all know that US taxpayers don't like to pay for USGov functions in general, and I would say, obviously as the inspector statistics would indicate, the inspection and enforcement part of it. Combined with the "let big business have it's way" attitude that seems to have pervaded the US mentality, pretty much since the 1960's, if not earlier (1890's), or the railroads in the (1970s), what can you expect. When nobody, or only the foxes are left guarding the chicken coup .... *&%(%^ happens. Now let's move on to the SEC. Am I wrong?
1) Why is it so 'effen hard to understand that ancient piping systems run up to and beyond their design pressures constitute a clear and present danger to the public ?
[highlight #3465A4]Pipe is buried, out of sight and out of mind.
[/highlight]
2) Why is it so hard to understand that some consider it criminal neglect by the federal government when no clear uniform criteria of design, installation and periodic testing uniform across the United States ?
CFRs Title 49 Part 192 & 195 (pretty much B31.8 and 4 codes copied into law) now form a uniform basis of minimum requirements across the nation. The problem is it was introduced relatively recently (80's) and it was not strictly applied to existing systems. There are a number of critical exclusions.
3) Why can't we do it like they can in Europe ????
IMO the US codes are more comprehensive (ASME B31) and generally well understood, even on an international basis, so I wouldn't say that it's a code deficiency or code implementation problem.
I think, as bimr's notes are the same points brought up in the judgement, it comes down to inspection and implementation. American business and taxpayers do not like regulations in general, never want them to apply to previous or existing works, nor do they like to pay for inspectors needed to ensure compliance. And engineers are considered overhead. DOT/PHMSA's 139 federal inspection and enforcement staff and over 300 state inspectors are responsible for regulating nearly 3,000 companies. 7 companies per inspector.
Contractors are contractors all around the world and always trying to push limits on specs and short cuts, so I consider that is a wash.
So we are left with implementation and operation. Of those two, geography and market size probably have the most significant effects. From " "America depends on a network of more than 185,000 miles of liquid petroleum pipelines, nearly 320,000 miles of gas transmission pipelines, and more than 2 million miles of gas distribution pipelines to safely and efficiently move energy and raw materials to fuel our nation's economic engine." By contrast, says that there are 33,000 miles of crude oil and product pipelines in the EU and 200,000 KM of gas (124,000 mi). The North Sea has roughly 450 platforms, while the Gulf of Mexico somewhere around 4,000. So I round that out to a US network that is 15X the size of the EU. Considering the number of PHMSA inspectors (439) that's over 5500 miles of pipe per inspector and 6 companies per inspector. A logistics nightmare, even before considering implementing any regulations.
Is there an attitude problem as well? We all know that US taxpayers don't like to pay for USGov functions in general, and I would say, obviously as the inspector statistics would indicate, the inspection and enforcement part of it. Combined with the "let big business have it's way" attitude that seems to have pervaded the US mentality, pretty much since the 1960's, if not earlier (1890's), or the railroads in the (1970s), what can you expect. When nobody, or only the foxes are left guarding the chicken coup .... *&%(%^ happens. Now let's move on to the SEC. Am I wrong?
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