Continue to Site

Eng-Tips is the largest engineering community on the Internet

Intelligent Work Forums for Engineering Professionals

  • Congratulations Ron247 on being selected by the Eng-Tips community for having the most helpful posts in the forums last week. Way to Go!

Titan sub noise heard on board support ship. 2

LittleInch

Petroleum
Mar 27, 2013
22,889
Just watched a new documentary by the BBC and others like Discovery so if you're interested look out for it. Implosion: The titanic sub disaster.

Key new part for me is that they released video of the moment a loud "crump" was actually heard on board the support vessel apparently through the hull with Rushs wife Wendy doing the monitoring of the sub and her saying "what was that?". They then got a message from the sub which must have been somehow delayed saying dropped two weights which confused them. It is pretty chilling to listen to alright. That and the fact that they were thought not to be at the ocean floor implies they were getting some warnings.

This is a clip but there are others.

Not much we didn't already know, but they have noted dive 81 (out of 88) where there was a very large bang heard which they reckon was the point at which the hull was on its last legs after a major internal failure.

The Discovery documentary maker back in 2022 was very unimpressed with the whole thing and persuaded the company to can their documentary as he was convinced it would end in failure and didn't want to be seen to promote the operation.

Looks like it's on Discovery pretty soon. If you're interested, it's pretty good and not that big into the human interest side, but does have input from the wife of the man and his son that died which is quite moving.

 
Last edited:
Replies continue below

Recommended for you

XR, he hoop strength of the tube is insufficient without the titanium dome. Any failures of the connection between the CF hull and the titanium ring will cause the CF hull to collapse.
Seems odd. So you are saying there is 2-way action going on in the hull despite all the fibers running circumferentially? (I believe)
 
Metals like titanium and aluminum instantly form oxides on their surface in air. Adhesion of epoxy or any paint or adhesive to oxides of metals weakens over time when exposed to moisture.

We know the joint was strong. It survived several dives. If the failure was at the joint, something must have weakened it.
 
Seems odd. So you are saying there is 2-way action going on in the hull despite all the fibers running circumferentially? (I believe)

The weave is bidirectional, like shirt fabric, designed to resist both hoop and axial stresses.

That said, the cylinder didn’t rely on the domes for buckling restraint, the domes merely capped the ends and transferred axial load into the hull.

Still, the strain mismatch at the junction, where the hull compressed radially by several millimetres more than the domes, could have introduced significant shear at the interface.

But regardless, the hull was cracking badly well away from the joint, pointing to deeper, more fundamental issues with the cylindrical structure itself.
 
Keep in mind that lawyers might be hiring people to find that the hull was defective so that try can pursue legal actions against Oceangate AND the company that fabricated the CF hull for a bigger pool of money. There is pressure that may be biasing these investigations.
 
I think the documentary glossed over the design and development process a little. It made it seem like, after a few early test failures, Stockton Rush jumped straight into a full-size sub. But if you look closely, those early failures appeared to involve failed carbon fibre end caps. Presumably that’s why the final sub used titanium ends.

Rush likely thought the problems were behind him: the cylindrical carbon fibre hull concept had (presumably) passed pressure tests, and the titanium end caps were solid. So in his mind, the design was validated. But he hasn’t counted on the slow progression of microcracks thru the cylindrical hull.
I am surprised more people haven't caught that yet.
 
For a company relying so much on the acoustic monitoring system its really bizarre that Stockton and Co just ignored the results/sounds and kept saying its fine, every sub makes noises....

Like once the data changes significantly after Dive 80 its clear you need to get a new hull or not put people in it. Especially since despite the testing they had no real idea when failure would occur in terms of number of dives or acoustic levels. All they knew was louder = bad and they ignored even that.
 
It is where they used experience in metallic submersible and submarines which do shake down and can creak to a completly different material.

Hence wyht eh cyclic testing and monitoring of the noises would have been so useful to actually give them a fingerprint of what was likely to happen and when.

The bang on dive 80 or 81 was so big it went off the chart, but was just ignored. No point in doing it if all you're doing it for is to give a false sense of condition monitoring to the passengers mission "specialists"
 
Not strictly true; they knew quite early on that any dissent was going to result in immediate dismissal.
Having their jobs threatened doesnt excuse employees from liability, an employee who violates civil or criminal law for any reason can be held personally liable alongside the company and manager. The legal choice is to quit, the illegal one is to follow orders.

SR didnt design and build the first sub nor redesign and build the second, employees did. Some were undoubtedly still with OG when they dove. Design engineers create and approve test plans so can be expected to know what is/isnt planned well in-advance, at a small company like OG everybody sees/hears more than most, and the employees in the documentary worked there several years each. IMHO they cant plausibly deny knowing what was planned or their involvement.
 
SR didnt design and build the first sub nor redesign and build the second, employees did. Some were undoubtedly still with OG when they dove. Design engineers create and approve test plans so can be expected to know what is/isnt planned well in-advance, at a small company like OG everybody sees/hears more than most, and the employees in the documentary worked there several years each. IMHO they cant plausibly deny knowing what was planned or their involvement.
You make it sound like they had some major decision making power in process, which might be true is other companies, but not OG. No employee had any power to order testing of the new hull design, nor change the design; all the design and test decisions were essentially made by Rush. Lochridge was fired almost immediately after documenting issues and concerns about the submersible; that made it clear that the company wanted zero dissent with anything that Rush dictated.
 
Having their jobs threatened doesnt excuse employees from liability, an employee who violates civil or criminal law for any reason can be held personally liable alongside the company and manager. The legal choice is to quit, the illegal one is to follow orders.

SR didnt design and build the first sub nor redesign and build the second, employees did. Some were undoubtedly still with OG when they dove. Design engineers create and approve test plans so can be expected to know what is/isnt planned well in-advance, at a small company like OG everybody sees/hears more than most, and the employees in the documentary worked there several years each. IMHO they cant plausibly deny knowing what was planned or their involvement.
I agree. There are approved engineering drawings out there. Assuming SR was the ultimate authority and signed off on every one of them, then the originators still have some culpability. Same with any subcontractors making components have some ethical responsibility to verify the design before they put their name on anything. Even if you believe they would be targeted unfairly, I don't see how they can plead innocence.
 
There are unfortunately too many people who decide that employment or payment for a contract is worth the low risk that anyone will actually hold you to account for sighing off things that they don't actually believe in. It's only in late years that I've had to do this a few times and held my ground and refused to put my name to certain reports or drawings.
 
The OG board members have some culpability too. Though they probably did not have direct control of design and testing, they apparently supported Stockton Rush as CEO. At least two of the board members have subsea/marine/naval experience. I have not seen any indications the board publicly questioned Stockton Rush's leadership of OG. The Lochridge OSHA whistle-blower filing and legal wrangling had to have been at least a line item in board meeting. The decision to forgo classing certification would have been known by the BOD.
 

Part and Inventory Search

Sponsor