dho...
Is 'big brother' a DoD agency, airline/cargo-carrier, smaller operator???
What is contractual rationale for this H2O level?, IE: Based on what... MM, TM, TO, NAVAIR,SAE ARP, ??
Sampling per SAE ARP598 or MM, TM, T.O.??
Have You checked the system at various sampling points, VERY CAREFULLY, to avoid introducing moisture contamination into the fluid sample?
Have You tested new hydraulic fluid to ensure it is free from moisture?
Have You tested the GSE hydraulic carts [‘mule’] for contamination? Has the customer checked their-own carts?
Does the customer check regularly check the system fluids for moisture, particulate-contamination chemical breakdown, etc… much like engine oils are lab [JOAP] tested … before sending the acft to You… or do You lab-check them as part of receiving inspection? Pre-existing contamination raises liability/contractual issues You may wish to consider. [see 'war-story' at end of this reply]
Do You service gas-pressurized components strictly with dry-nitrogen… or is there a potential that ordinary air or ‘dry-air’ was used to charge the system [IE: hydraulic reservoir, charged cylinders, etc]? Is it possible that the operator failed to use dry nitrogen?
Does the system have any entrapped air due to leakage?
What hydraulic fluid [some are more prone to moisture contamination]…???
Petroleum Base, EX: MIL-PRF-5606
Synthetic, fire resistant, EX: MIL-PRF-83282, MIL-PRF-87257
Phosphate Ester, EX: SAE AS1241
Have the petro/synth base oils been mixed, ILO, full purge/cleaning to avoid mixing
Have You considered 100% system drain purge of all oil/fluid? NOTE.
Due to multiple issues, I’ve discovered that USAF acft [older generation] rarely/if-ever have the systems fully drained, purged/cleaned, thru the jets’ lifetime.
Following document might refer to documents of interest, for further review…
SAE AIR737 Aerospace Hydraulic and Pneumatic Specifications, Standards, Recommended Practices, and Information Reports
'another Taylor war-story'
One jet I investigated in the field lost a LH inbd slat during aerial maneuvering... resulting in fragments that FOD'ed the #1 engine and damaged the inlet lip. The only pieces of the slat were fittings that appeared ‘twisted’ on the ends of (2) 'parallel' actuators. These dual separated actuators for the slat were supposed to be matched/coordinated to act simultaneously [rate of extension, thrust, etc]. However it was very obvious from a field contamination check, that one actuator system metering orifice was partially blocked with many-types of contaminates... very visible on a white coffee-filter; and 10X magnification of the orifice hole. This actuator was ‘slower’ than the adjacent actuator during both extension and retraction. The result was a serious ‘force-fight’ between the different-rate-actuators and rigid slat-tracks that twisted/bent the slat during each extension and retraction cycle... which eventually led to it tearing in-half and departing the aircraft in pieces. Records review and discussions with Acft-type the engineering staff made it painfully obvious that that the system had NEVER been drained/purged/cleaned... and the jet was +20-years old.
Regards, Wil Taylor
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